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2 
Introduction 
 
In terms of wealth, power, and modernity, Japan has been one of the 
major powers in the world since the late 19th century. Yet it occupies a 
strangely curious position within the historical and theoretical accounts 
of the international system offered not only by the approaches to 
International Relations (IR) dominant in the West, but also by non-
Western, and postcolonial approaches. Even the term ‘non-Western’ 
presupposes a problematic binary that associates mainstream to 
Western, which leaves Japan sometimes in, and sometimes out. For 
postcolonial IR, Japan does not fit easily into the perpetrator/victim 
binaries of either colonialism or racism. For mainstream IR it does not fit 
comfortably into its generally Eurocentric accounts, whether these be 
defined by modernity; or by a core-periphery global structure of wealth, 
power, and/or ‘civilization’; or by a polarity structure; or by the social 
structure of a mainly Western formed international society. Rethinking 
Japan in IR thus contributes to rethinking the interrelated pairings of 
binaries and identity politics, such as white imperialist/nonwhite 
colonized that permeate not just postcolonialism but mainstream IR 
more broadly.1 Since the critical and mainstream stories do not mesh 
well, we focus in this article on Japan in mainstream IR, saving the 
critical and non-Western stories for later. 
 
The mainstream IR story of Japan starts from the puzzle of how to fit an 
early-rising Asian country into the generally Eurocentric accounts of 
modernity. Japan is usually placed as an outsider to the Western core of 
modernity, leaving it as an odd exception to a ‘backward’, ‘stagnant’ 
Asia, despite the fact that it uniquely prefigured the rise of the rest by a 
century. Japan’s groundbreaking defeat of Russia in 1904-5, 
acknowledged as a major event at the time, now hardly registers in IR’s 
 
1 Realism and liberalism (all versions), and (mainly Wendtian) constructivism, are 
conventionally viewed as the ‘big three’ of IR theory, certainly in the US, where 
neorealism and neoliberalism have largely merged in a ‘neo-neo’ synthesis. These 
big three are also significantly dominant in Europe, and wherever American 
approaches to IR have been influential. Some, including us, would include 
International Political Economy (IPE), with its significant Marxian content, and the 
English School, in the group of dominant approaches. We refer to these collectively 
as ‘mainstream’ approaches, mainly attempting to explain international relations. We 
differentiate them from more critical approaches to IR including poststructuralism, 
postcolonialism, and feminism. To the extent that Japan’s story is told in IR, it is 
mainly told in the framings of these five mainstream approaches. On this, and on the 
problematic West/non-West distinction, see the special issue of International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 7:3 (2007) on ‘Why is there no non-Western IR 
theory?’, the follow-on paper in 17:3 (2017) 341-70, and Acharya and Buzan, 2010, 
229-33. 
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otherwise war-obsessed set of benchmark dates (Buzan and Lawson, 
2014a). Its brief bid for imperial hegemony over Asia during the 1930s 
and 40s registers as a flash, unpleasantly associated with the 
aggressive fascist bid for world power. And then Japan largely 
disappears from view in IR. Only those who specialise in IPE or East 
Asia note its economic resurgence during the Cold War. As a ‘civilian 
power’ it largely drops out of realist polarity theory, not only for its lack of 
military power, and its constitution’s Article 9 renouncing the use of force 
to resolve international disputes, but also for its security dependence on 
the US. Japan is somehow always the unique exception that doesn’t fit 
neatly into the Eurocentric and mainly realist way that IR tells its stories 
about the last 150 years. 
 
This year marks the 150th anniversary of Japan’s Meiji 
Restoration/Revolution which many mark as the beginning of Japan’s 
turn to the West, and destabilizing of the West-non-West binary. The aim 
of this paper is to overthrow the mythologies of both uniqueness and 
misplacement of Japan.2 In doing so it exposes the distortions imposed 
on how Japan is understood not only by being viewed through the lens 
of Eurocentrism, but also by being viewed through the lenses of 
mainstream IR theories, particularly realism. Eurocentrism implies 
relationships among race, imperialism, and development, that continue 
to contour the lines of debate in both IR and contemporary global 
politics. Realism imposes military-heavy understandings of power that 
sometimes fit Japan’s case, and sometimes result in occlusion. We 
pursue this aim by retelling in chronological sequence four stories of 
modern Japan in international relations.3 The aim of these stories is to 
show the limits of mainstream IR story-telling by stripping away the 
distortions of Eurocentrism and realism, and showing how Japan’s 
impact on modern international relations has been wider and deeper 
than is generally acknowledged.  
• First, Japan was part of the group of early modernizing countries, and 
this undoes the Eurocentric link between white/West and modernity. 
 
2 A significant caveat to our claim against uniqueness is that we deal only with Japan 
and make no attempt to propose a general framework applicable to other countries. 
Japan is often compared with Germany on the grounds of both being defeated great 
powers. This is valid, but superficial, and applies only post-1945. Japan’s story is 
affected by Eurocentrism in a way that Germany’s is not, involving race and non-
Western culture. 
3 These stories fall roughly into standard periodizations of IR: 19th century, interwar 
years, and post-1945. Each focuses on a particular neglected or distorted theme 
within that period. While there is considerable discontinuity in the military theme 
emphasized by realism, there is much more continuity in terms of economics and 
development. 
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This initial misplacement of Japan underpins the subsequent 
distortions in how mainstream IR tells its story.  
• Second, as the local core of modernity, Japan played a very 
significant role in Northeast Asia’s development up to 1945. Because 
development in East Asia is tightly associated with state legitimacy, 
Japan’s role in it is a difficult issue both for its former colonies and for 
the West. 
• Third, from 1902-1945, Japan played a full global role as a great 
power, and made a large and lasting impact on world history and 
politics.  
• Fourth, once it had recovered from the devastation of the Second 
World War, Japan quickly picked up its key role as the modernizing 
core for East Asia. It did this in complicity with, and subordination to, 
the US, in the process providing a vital economic and ideological 
foundation for the successful US claim to global superpower status.  
The penultimate section discusses how our repositioning of Japan plays 
into the situation as we move into a post-Western and post-East Asian 
World Order where China and others are at last finding their own paths 
to modernity. The conclusions consider what explains Japan’s 
misplacement, and often marginalization, in IR. 
 
Japan in the Context of Emerging Modernity 
 
How does Japan fit into the process of modernity that took off during the 
19th century? The way this story is told (or not told) is heavily influenced 
by Eurocentrism, and except as it relates to Japan’s military 
development is marginalized by realism. Japan is usually placed as the 
one non-white/Western country that somehow modernized a century 
before any other non-white/Western state, and became recognized as a 
great power by other leading states. It does not fit the broader story 
about an Asia of stagnant agrarian states either being colonized by 
Western powers (South and Southeast Asia) or having violent, 
sustained, and unequal encounters with them from a position of 
weakness (China). China and Japan started in similar positions, but 
quickly and sharply diverged (Gray, 2002: vii). Neither does it fit within 
the Western story, which likes to see the decisive emergence of a stable 
modernity as something that happened in (white) Western Europe and 
North America. A constant question is whether Japan is part of the East 
or part of the West, reflected in Japanese slogans such as wakon yosai 
(Japanese spirit western technology) or Yukichi Fukuzawa’s often 
misinterpreted essay on ‘leaving Asia’ to join the West. Japan’s relation 
to modernity, we argue, productively refuses a binary, West/non-West, 
mainstream account of both development and world history. Critics of 
Eurocentrism in IR also have a vexed relationship with Japan: while its 
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defeat of Russia was a cause to celebrate the agency of a non-
white/Western power, this narrative then often leaves out Japan 
because it joins the club of colonial great powers. Its early modernization 
is potentially a major threat to the whole West-centric story of modernity, 
and also thereby to Eurocentric and anti-Eurocentric accounts of how 
the modern international system unfolded.   
 
To discuss the history of Japan without succumbing to the historical 
development narrative that naturalizes Eurocentric modernity, we 
juxtapose Landes’ (1969) and Rosenberg’s (2010, 2013, 2016) theories 
of development. Landes’ (1969: 39, 124-6, chs. 3 and 4) argument 
represents the mainstream view of modernity that Britain was the only 
case of sustained ‘self-generated’ industrial modernity, and that all other 
cases are necessarily versions of ‘emulative response’ (e.g. Pomeranz, 
2000). From the late 19th century, Britain’s rising wealth and power was 
both an opportunity for, and a threat to, other powers. They faced 
intense pressure to copy the British model, but found it extremely difficult 
to adapt its complex social, economic and political features to their own 
limitations and advantages.  
 
Rosenberg’s argument concerns uneven and combined development 
(UCD). It posits three drivers lying behind the universality of uneven 
development: first, the diversity of geographical and resource 
endowments; second, the physical separation of political units (IR 
theory’s familiar anarchic structure); and third, the differential impact of 
‘combination’. ‘Combination’ means the ways in which social orders 
trade, coerce, emulate, borrow and steal from each other, and, like 
unevenness, can vary greatly in degree. Before the 19th century, 
geography facilitated combination where there were available sea and 
river routes, but mountains, deserts, long distances, and harsh climates 
obstructed it. Since the 19th century, combination has been massively 
and permanently facilitated by industrial technologies that overcame 
geographical constraints: steamships, railways, highways, aircraft, 
spacecraft, the telegraph and the internet (see also Baldwin, 2016). 
Combination therefore increases directly with the third element of UCD: 
‘development’, which for our purposes is broadly synonymous with 
modernization. In Rosenberg’s formula, a new social configuration 
spreads outward from its point or points of origin, and has varied effects 
depending on both the timing of its arrival, and the local conditions of the 
cultures it impacts. 
 
Landes’ and Rosenberg’s analyses fit together nicely. The starting point 
for the new configuration was Britain, whose industrial modernization 
was, by the early 19th century, creating both extreme unevenness of 
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development, and a rapidly accelerating level of combination. Britain’s 
industrial modernity opened up what today is seen as a spectrum of 
developed and underdeveloped economies defined in terms of an ever-
advancing standard of modernity. The ideas, institutions and products of 
modernity flowed out of Britain on a global scale, carried by both 
coercion and commerce. They forced other countries and peoples to 
adapt or resist as best they could. As Bairoch (1982: 272) makes clear, 
responding was not easy: the revolutionary changes towards industrial 
modernity that began in Britain ‘took over half a century to be initiated 
and copied elsewhere’, even amongst the small group of successful 
early responders. Some countries and cultures adapted to it with varying 
degrees of success. Some collapsed. Many were subordinated by the 
huge power gap that opened up between the handful of successful early 
modernizers and all the others, what Pomeranz (2000) called ‘the great 
divergence’. Where does Japan fit into this picture of the first round of a 
globally spreading modernity? 
 
That Japan was a member of the quite small core group of countries that 
achieved durable industrial modernity before the First World War is clear 
from the statistics, though the placement of Japan troubles some 
economic historians. Bairoch (1982: 288) excludes Japan from both the 
developed country group and the underdeveloped group. In his 
millennial perspective on global development, Maddison (2001) does 
eventually include it in his ‘Group A’ of developed states, along with 
Western Europe, the US and the white commonwealth countries. His 
‘Group B’ is the third world in Africa, Asia and Latin America, none of 
which achieved durable industrial modernity until a century later when 
the Asian tigers led the way, followed by China. Maddison’s, and 
Baldwin’s (2016) placement of Japan acknowledges that it was part of 
the handful of countries that responded successfully and early to the 
British challenge, achieving durable modernity before 1914. The data 
therefore show that Japan is located in ‘Group A’ rather than ‘Group B’.  
 
Geographically, Japan had the disadvantage of being almost as far from 
the British point of origin of industrial modernity as it was possible to get. 
Western and Northern Europe, the US, and Russia, were either close to 
Britain, and/or strongly connected to it by commerce, immigration and 
war. By contrast, Japan was on the end of a long and tenuous trading 
route, and under the Tokugawa Shogunate had, except for a small 
window in Nagasaki where Dutch-Japan relations informed the 
Japanese worldview, insulated itself for more than two centuries from 
trade and cultural contact with the West, though remaining open to trade 
and cultural contact with China and Korea (Jansen, 2000: ch. 3; Toby, 
1991; Hamashita, 2003). When Commodore Perry’s gunboat diplomacy 
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‘opened’ Japan in 1853, it began an encounter with both the West and 
modernity that was later, and therefore more intense, than for the other 
members of the successful first responder group.  
 
But the disadvantage of distance was also an advantage. Japan was 
shielded from colonization both by its remoteness, and by the greater 
interest of the Western powers in the riches of China. After the 1857 
uprising in India, Britain was disinclined to pay the cost of direct rule, and 
the US was more interested in ‘open doors’ than in colonial rule. As with 
China (Gray, 2002: 101-3, 118-23; Darwin, 2007: 353), the Western 
powers preferred to use unequal treaties to extract profit from Japan 
(Duus, 1998). Furthermore, the Japanese elites were prompted to take 
modernization seriously by the British defeat of Qing China in the Opium 
War. Upon hearing of the British victory, samurai scholar Shozan 
Sakuma noted that the era of the kingly way was over, now is the era of 
might (Matsuda, 2002: 7).  
 
The standard picture of the rise and spread of industrial modernity has 
Britain remaining dominant until at least 1860. The most successful early 
imitators were Switzerland, Belgium, France and the US, and by the 
1870s, Germany and the US were catching up (Bairoch, 1982: 272, 290-
91). Although starting late, Japan was part of a third group of first round 
modernizers along with Russia, Italy, Spain, and Austria-Hungary 
(Bairoch, 1981: 10; Bairoch, 1982, 294-95). This core, along with the 
white commonwealth and some smaller European countries, together 
comprise the first general round of industrial modernization. For the 
century following 1870, the game of competitive modernity was largely 
played within this set. The second general round did not begin until the 
rise of the East Asian Tigers during the 1970s, reinforcing Bairoch’s 
point that emulation was not easy.4 Like the first responders to Britain, 
the second-round responders of the third world took half-a-century to 
catch up with the first round modernizers.  
 
Domestic factors also matter. Unlike most other non-Western countries, 
and some Western ones, most notably in Eastern Europe and Iberia, 
Japan had relatively favourable domestic conditions to facilitate its 
transformation. During the 18th century, before industrial modernity had 
made a big impact, Japan’s life expectancy, increase in per capita 
income growth, and GDP per capita were comparable to levels in 
Western Europe (Maddison, 2001: 27, 38, 46). It had a well-developed 
commercial economy, and its class structure, demography and land 
 
4 Bairoch was talking about the difficulties for countries that were not colonized by, 
but in competition with early modernizers. Additional obstacles confronted those who 
were colonized, though as we show below there were some exceptions to this. 
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ownership were all favourable for modernization (Curtin, 2000: 156-71; 
Pomeranz, 2000; Totman, 2005: locs. 8028-56; Allinson and Anievas, 
2010: 479-85). Unlike China, where foreign pressure further weakened 
the dynasty, the Meiji reformers in Japan created a stabilizing, though 
flawed, fusion of tradition (the emperor and Shinto) and modernity 
(Gluck, 1985). They quickly put in place a modern nation-state that could 
cultivate nationalism, pursue industrialization, and resist foreign takeover 
(Jansen, 2000, chs. 11-12; Totman, 2005: locs. 8198-8429). In 1871, 
Japan sent the Iwakura Mission to observe how things were done in 
Western countries, and hired experts from abroad to help with all 
aspects of modernization. Yukichi Fukuzawa in 1872 noted how science 
and technology is a recent development in the West also, therefore 
rendering the gap manageable (Fukuzawa, 2012; Jansen, 2000: locs. 
5364-5438). Between 1870 and 1913 Japan broadly caught up with 
rates of growth in Western Europe for population, GDP and GDP/capita 
(Maddison, 2001: 126). Japan’s GDP tripled, comparable to Germany 
and Russia, and better than Britain, France and Italy; and its GDP/capita 
doubled, slightly exceeding the rate in Western Europe (Maddison, 
2001: 129, 206, 261, 264-5).5 Between 1820 and 1913 Japan’s share of 
the global GDP held fairly steady at around 3% as it kept pace with the 
industrializing leading edge. Life expectancy in Japan also rose during 
this period, as it did in the other core countries (Topik and Wells, 2012: 
602-3; Osterhammel, 2014: 170-72).  
 
Japan was a comparative late-starter on the run to modernity. Although 
comparable in size to most Western economies in 1820, by 1870 
Japan’s GDP was slightly more than half of Italy’s and a third of 
Germany’s, and about a quarter of that of Britain and the US. By 1913 it 
was still about a third of Britain’s, Germany’s and Russia’s, but had 
nearly caught up with Italy (Maddison, 2007: 379). In terms of total 
manufacturing output, Japan ranked 8th by 1913, 20 percent of the 
British level and 17 percent of the German one (Bairoch, 1982: 284). 
The relative values of its merchandise exports 1870-1913 rose fast from 
15-315, remaining much smaller than Germany and Britain, but 
comparable to Russia (216-783) (Maddison, 360-62). Japan’s share of 
world manufacturing output is comparable to Italy’s between 1870 and 
1913. Japan overtook France in total industrial capacity during the 1930s 
(Bairoch, 1982: 301), but not until the 1960s did it catch up with the 
leading industrial powers in scale, surpassing the Soviet Union during 
the 1980s.  
 
 
5 Similar social dynamics make it fairer to compare Japan to Western Europe. The 
US grew much faster because mass migration was expanding its population rapidly. 
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As the data show, Japan, despite being geographically non-Western and 
as far away as possible from Britain, became clearly part of the 19th 
century core of early modernizers. Japan reacted to the external 
pressure of the new configuration of modernity, and created domestic 
conditions conducive to the pursuit of modernity. It matched the later 
modernizers within the first round, and left behind even those un- or de-
colonized European countries that failed to respond effectively to the 
challenge of modernity. In line with UCD, Japan generated its own 
distinctive fusion of culture and modernity, which became the template 
for the Asian developmental state.6  
 
Japan as the Regional Core for Asian Modernity  
 
Given its perceived cultural and geographical proximity, Meiji Japan 
quickly became both a model for other peripheral modernizers 
(Osterhammel, 2014: 560, 563), and was recognized as such by 
Chinese and Korean reformers (Gray, 2002: 216-19; Schell and Delury, 
2013: loc. 801). Between 1870 and 1930 Japan gave considerable 
inspiration and assistance to Chinese modernizers. As Schell and Delury 
(2013: 147) note: ‘This was the decade [before the 1914] when Chinese 
intellectual and political avant garde figures were all converging on their 
island neighbour to study the Meiji model’. Some came as students, 
others as political refugees, from both China and other parts of Asia. 
They included big names such as: Wang Jingwei (Mitter: 2013: loc. 679), 
Liang Qichao (Osterhammel, 2014: 786; Schell and Delury, 2013: 78, 
99), Chen Duxiu (Schell and Delury, 2013: 142-7), Chiang Kai-shek, Sun 
Yat-sen (Schell and Delury, 2013: 175) and Rash Behari Bose. Japan’s 
successful revision of unequal treaties imposed by Western powers 
meant that foreign powers could not pursue such people within Japan. In 
the three decades before 1937 some 30,000 Chinese studied in Japan 
(Mitter, 2013: locs. 462, 658). Japan provided for China much of the 
language and conceptual structure for Asian modernity (Duara, 2015: 
84-7). Much of China’s military modernization, such as Yuan Shi-kai’s 
Beiyang Army, was modelled on Japan, and both Sun Yat-sen and the 
northern warlords vied for Japanese support (Peattie, 2007: 174-7, 182). 
 
The need for modernization advocated by these reformists became 
pitted against conservative factions within China and Korea who upheld 
traditional values and resisted modernization/Westernization. Unlike in 
Japan, this resistance was successful enough to render China and 
Korea ripe for external intervention. Both the Sino-Japanese War and 
Russo-Japanese War can be understood as the intersection of domestic 
 
6 On the Asian developmental state see Beeson and Breslin, 2014. 
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desire for modernization in China and Korea, with Japan as the 
mediator, on the one hand, and the externally imposed modernization 
that was phrased in the language of the ‘civilizing mission’ with Japan as 
the colonizer, on the other. Fukuzawa’s essay, ‘Datsu-A Ron’ [Leave 
Asia] published in 1885, penned immediately after the failed Gapsin 
Coup in Choseon Korea, argued that Japan must decisively disconnect 
from Korea and China because continued association with them risked 
the West lumping Japan with Asia as the stagnant Other. Fukuzawa, a 
liberal thinker, was therefore supportive of the Sino-Japanese War, since 
for him forced Enlightenment was better than refusal of modernity. In the 
name of civilizing mission, Japan therefore became a direct agent of 
modernization in Northeast Asia (Dudden 2006). It is in this sense that 
the line between serving as a model and imposing a model is both 
difficult to draw and politically charged. Ironically, while Japan became a 
model and intellectual hub for many Asians, the Japanese views of its 
Asian Others were sharply split. While some in Japan supported the 
Chinese and Korean modernizers, others did not (Jansen, 2000: locs. 
7709-7790; Peattie, 2007: 174-7). Right from the beginning, Japan has 
been divided about how to relate to both its region and the Western 
powers.  
 
The net result of this was that Japan contributed to the development of 
its neighbours, not only by offering inspiration, education, and sanctuary, 
but also by effectively imposing on its colonies, especially Korea, Taiwan 
and Manchuria, a version of its own Meiji reforms. At the outset, Japan 
undertook a ‘civilizing mission’ towards its ‘underdeveloped’ neighbours 
(Dudden, 2006). But this mode of colonial rule changed after the First 
World War. There was a surge of anti-colonial independence 
movements (May 4th movement in China, March 1st movement in Korea) 
within Japan’s colonies and sphere of influence, inspired by Woodrow 
Wilson’s support for self-determination. And the Japanese military 
learned the lesson that the next war had to be fought as a total war 
based on a sustainable and self-sufficient regional bloc that was geared 
to enhancing Japan’s power. This continental strategy in turn created 
tension between the military and the Japanese state. It was in the spirit 
of collaborating with the US and British that Japanese political leaders 
agreed to the Naval reduction treaty. But perception in the military that 
the terms were unequal fed resentment, motivating its takeover of the 
civilian government (Paine, 2017: 77-108). Imperial development during 
the interwar period was about denying domestic anti-colonial 
movements in the name of pursuing Japanese and Asian regional 
autonomy on the one hand, and the geopolitical logic of creating a 
greater Japan, with a sufficient industrial and resource depth to defend 
itself and Asia from Western imperialism, on the other.  
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This culminated in the ‘greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere’ 
(GEACPS). In the event, despite, and because of, the term ‘co’ in the 
prosperity sphere, the GEACPS ended up being largely defined in terms 
of the harsh and exploitative practices of the Japanese empire. But 
some of the prior thinking behind it in Japan took ‘co-prosperity’ 
seriously, though with Japan as the leader, but with a much more 
communitarian and developmental intent on the regional scale (Williams, 
2004: 30; Goto-Jones, 2005; Sakai, 2008: 241-8). As noted earlier, 
Japan’s relation to its Asian neighbors oscillated between ‘rising 
together’ and ‘leaving Asia’ —it is in the spirit of the former that the logic 
of both denial of autonomy of other Asians and the creation of regional 
block intertwine. And this communitarian/cooperative intent differentiates 
Japan’s imperial relations in terms of development. As Cumings (1984: 
12-13) notes, before 1945 Japan was ‘among the very few imperial 
powers to have located modern heavy industries in its colonies: steel, 
chemicals, hydroelectric facilities in Korea and Manchuria, and 
automobile production for a time in the latter…. By 1945 Korea had an 
industrial infrastructure that, although sharply skewed towards 
metropolitan interests, was among the best developed in the third world’. 
Kohli (2004: 25-61) shows in detail how Japanese colonial rule was far 
more penetrative and modernizing than British and French, reshaping 
Korean agriculture, transforming the class and political structures, 
abolishing slavery, and creating an export-orientated modern economy 
with a substantial industrial sector. Although this was a coercive, 
repressive, colonial state, it also laid the foundations of modernity, in the 
process co-opting substantial sections of Korean society (Tudor, 2012: 
19).  
 
As told by Duara (2003, see also Paine, 2017: 115-18) a somewhat 
similar story can be found in Manchuria except that in Manchukuo the 
Japanese tried to construct not so much a colony as an ‘independent’, if 
highly penetrated, nation-state (Duara, 2003: locs 116-23). Despite 
strenuous diplomatic efforts by Japan, this project failed to get 
international recognition, and despite some success in creating a 
national politics in Manchukuo, was eventually undermined by Japan’s 
extractive wartime demands and discriminatory racism. Nevertheless, 
during the period of Japanese rule, Manchuria was substantially 
industrialized and modernized. It too had a version of the Meiji 
modernization model thrust forcibly on it, becoming a highly authoritarian 
and repressive developmental state. It is revealing that the large inward 
migration from China into Manchuria that had been going on since the 
1890s continued apace during the Japanese occupation. While some 
Chinese resisted Japan’s takeover, many others were drawn in by the 
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expanding economic opportunities and the chance to escape the chaos 
of China’s failed state (Duara, 2003: 68). Koreans also played a 
significant role in Japan’s colonization and modernization of Manchuria.  
 
Taiwan likewise got significant infrastructure and industrial development. 
Japan treated Taiwan, like Korea, in many ways as part of itself, 
including extending to the population is own system of mass education 
(Gray, 2002: 456). Between 1910 and 1940, both Korea and Taiwan had 
higher average GDP growth than Japan’s 3.36%. Korea’s manufacturing 
capacity grew at 10% per annum (Cumings, 1984: 2). Albeit in self-
interested fashion, Japan thus laid the social as well as the material 
foundations for the successful remodernizations of South Korea and 
Taiwan as Asian tigers after the Second World War. In doing so, 
however, it also left them with the dilemma of how to link their state 
legitimacy to that history. Japan’s Manchurian venture had a different 
fate, with much of its industry stripped out by the invading Russians 
(Duara, 2003; Paine, 2012: locs. 5003-5039). Japan laid in its colonies 
the foundations for wealth and power while simultaneously 
compromising their culture and autonomy.  
 
Against these developmental contributions to its neighbours, stands the 
monstrous damage that Japan inflicted not only on its colonies in the 
name of development, but also on China and its Asia-Pacific neighbours 
as a imperial power. The developmental state model was ruthlessly 
applied on internal (Hokkaido) and external colonies. Such behaviour 
leaves assessing the meaning of development in postcolonial societies 
in a difficult impasse: how does one judge ruthless development 
imposed by outsiders against ruthless development imposed by 
authoritarian regimes on their own people? Against China during its war 
of conquest between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese killed between 14-20 
million Chinese (Mitter: 2013, locs. 283, 6734) and injured something 
like the same number. They wreaked huge destruction on the Chinese 
economy, leaving much of China’s own industrial and infrastructure 
modernization during the 1920s and 30s in ruins (Mitter, 2013: loc. 283; 
Paine, 2012: locs. 4624-84). On top of this, Japan’s invasion, and 
China’s resistance to it, displaced as internal refugees perhaps 80-100 
million people, 15-20 percent of China’s population (Mitter, 2013: loc. 
2222). This was a massive blow to China’s development, and war 
damage was also widespread throughout Japan’s sphere of control in 
the Asia-Pacific. In addition, there were the massacres of civilians, the 
use of POW for medical experiments, and the recruitment of women into 
military prostitution, all of which have fueled deep and bitter history 
problems between Japan  and both China and Korea (‘Impact of 
History’, 2007-8; Tanaka, 2008; Togo, 2008a&b). What all this 
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underscores, is how treating the story of development strictly in terms of 
military and economic modernization desensitizes one to the politics of 
development. Japan’s omission from, and inclusion in, various narratives 
of IR must be partly understood as a consequence of this broader 
tension over the meaning of development in IR. 
 
Japan as a Great Power from late 19th Century to 1945 
 
Japan made it into the ranks of the recognized great powers partly by 
meeting the Western ‘standard of civilization’ (Gong, 1984), partly by 
building up an industrial economy and a modern army and navy, partly 
by participating in great power diplomacy, and partly by winning wars 
and making alliances with other great powers. This part of Japan’s story 
fits well with realist criteria, and although its telling is tinged with 
Eurocentrism, is reasonably well represented in mainstream IR accounts 
of this period. But like its early contributions to Northeast Asian 
modernization, Japan’s record as a normal great power of the time, is 
overshadowed by its aggressions during the 1930s and 40s. Yet for the 
first three decades of the 20th century, Japan was part of the great power 
club even though the ‘standard of civilization’ was certainly not color-
blind. Despite its own embrace of imperialism, Japan made some 
significant contributions to anti-colonialism and anti-racism.  
 
From the beginning, the Meiji leadership aimed to escape being 
colonized. They emulated the style and form of the great powers of the 
day, which was to modernize internally, and build an empire externally. 
Appropriating the Eurocentric language of international law against the 
Sinocentric tributary practices, Japan invaded Taiwan in 1874 (annexing 
it formally in 1895), fought wars for overseas territory with both China 
(1894-5) and Russia (1904-5), and annexed Korea (1910). Such reforms 
went hand in hand with efforts to achieve equal diplomatic and political 
status. Japan campaigned vigorously against unequal treaties – 
extraterritoriality was revoked in the late 1890s and tariff controls were 
removed in 1911 (Gong, 1984: 164-96; Howland, 2016). Japan worked 
hard to meet the ‘standard of civilization’ which appeared colour-blind 
both internally and externally. In both the 1894-5 war against China, and 
the 1904-5 one against Russia, the Japanese went out of their way to 
treat prisoners of war in a humane fashion, carefully following the 
international law of war to demonstrate its ‘civilized’ nature (Paine, 2003: 
175, 209; Howland, 2016). 
 
Japanese victory against China put Japan on the road to recognition as 
a great power, but it met a setback with the Triple Intervention by 
Russia, Germany and France afterwards, which took away some of its 
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gains in China. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 gave Japan great 
power recognition, and its defeat of Russia three years later both 
reinforced this status, and signaled new possibilities for the meaning and 
implication of being ‘non-Western’. The global significance of Japan’s 
victory is little recognized now, but was fully apparent at the time. Alfred 
Zimmern, a leading academic in British interwar IR, announced to his 
Oxford class that: ‘I feel I must speak to you about the most important 
historical event that has happened, or is likely to happen, in our lifetime: 
the victory of a non-white people over a white people’ (Vitalis, 2005: 
168). This remark illustrates the importance of race during the early 20th 
century. It underlines how Japan’s military victories broke the myth of 
invincible white power established during the 19th century, giving 
inspiration, except for those subjugated by Japan, to anti-colonial 
movements around the world (Westad, 2007: 88-9). The ‘awakening’ 
prompted by Japan’s defeat of Russia was realized in nationalist 
revolutions against ‘backwardness’ in Iran, China and the Ottoman 
empire, as well as in the resurgence of a ‘pan-Asian’ strand of thought 
whose leading voices, such as the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore, 
commanded large audiences (Collins, 2011). The Young Turks sought to 
make the Ottoman state the ‘Japan of the Near East’, praising its 
assertiveness and fashioning of a distinctly ‘Asian modernity’ (Aydin, 
2007: 78). The early 20th century modernizers around the emperor in 
Ethiopia were called Japanizers (Westad, 2007: 253).  
 
Japan’s rise to great power status also resulted in rendering more 
explicit the underlying issue of racism in international politics. As 
Shimazu (1998) argues, racial discrimination against Japan threatened 
Japan’s standing as a great power by casting it as inferior to white 
powers and placing it alongside the non-white subjects of the colonies. 
This was rubbed in by anti-Japanese and anti-Asian immigration policies 
in the US, Canada and Australia, and by Woodrow Wilson’s joining of 
Britain in rejecting the bid for the inclusion of racial equality clause 
proposed by Japan (Clark, 2007: 83-106). Though motivated by its own 
concern over discrimination against Japanese immigration, Japan 
confronted the white great powers with the issue of racism at the 
Versailles negotiations during 1919. Although this was not about racial 
equality as a general principle since Japan wanted equality for itself 
while it continued to discriminate against its Asian neighbours, Western 
discrimination against Japanese immigrants fueled the anti-Western turn 
in Japanese policy that laid the basis for geopolitical contestation during 
the inter-war years, thereby implicitly racializing the meaning of war.  
 
The apparent contradiction of being both non-White and imperialist, 
must be understood in this light. The racial equality clause was vetoed 
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by the US and Britain, yet despite its failure to gain racial equality, Japan 
functioned as a normal member of the great power club. At the 
Washington Naval Conference in 1921-2 it won designation as the third-
ranked naval power ahead of France and Italy. It seized Manchuria in 
1931, which was already a semi-autonomous warlord state, and as 
noted made a colonial state there. It invaded China in 1937, but despite 
many military victories was unable to defeat China. It was badly 
defeated in a short border war against the Soviet Union in 1939, joined 
the Axis Alliance with Germany and Italy in 1940, made a nonaggression 
pact with the Soviet Union  in 1941, and opened war against Britain and 
the US in 1941 (Paine, 2012). It is notable how, once Japan declared 
war against the US and Britain, the right wing Kyoto School philosophers 
latched onto the prevalence of pan-Asianist sentiments in the world 
beyond Japan’s immediate control by emphasizing as a central theme 
the breaking of ‘white power’ (Yonetani, 2006). In the run-up to the 
Second World War, Japan, like several other great powers, left the 
League of Nations. Ironically, its legitimation was anchored in the 
language of internationalism, in the name of bringing peace through an 
alternative regional bloc that rejected Anglo-American dominance (Abel, 
2015). Because of IR’s own forgetting of its origins (Vitalis, 2005), 
internationalism is generally posed as an antithesis to imperialism, 
thereby also rendering Japan’s behavior an anomaly. By the standards 
of the day, Japan’s military strength was impressive despite its economy 
still being less developed than those of the leading Western great 
powers. By 1941, for example, Japan’s ‘Zero’ fighter, and its Type 93 
‘Long Lance’ torpedoes, were superior to anything in the US arsenal, 
and it had built the world’s biggest battleship (Yamato). Despite both its 
own colonialism, and eventually being defeated, Japan’s early victories 
over the US, Britain, France and the Dutch during 1941-2 broke their 
colonial grip in Asia and significantly paved the way for the 
decolonization of the region (Paine, 2017: 175).  
 
Japan’s four-decade run as an imperial great power ended with the 
devastation of its cities and industry by the Allied Powers, and the near 
complete obliteration of its navy and merchant marine. The nuclear 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened a narrative of Japan as a 
victim rather than victimizer, thereby occluding its past as a great power 
and continually postponing Japan from facing its history problem with its 
neighbours. Nevertheless, as Paine (2017: 149-56, 185; 2012: locs. 
4624-84, 5823) argues, Japan’s run as an independent great power had 
two other major and enduring consequences for world politics. First, the 
failure of Japan and Germany to coordinate against the Soviet Union at 
the crucial moments, significantly affected the outcome of the war in 
Europe and thus all that followed. Second, by breaking the power and 
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legitimacy of the Nationalist government in China, Japan ensured the 
victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war, as Mao himself 
acknowledged (Jansen, 2000: loc. 10003; Gray, 2002: vii, 270).  
 
1952-Present: A Pillar of the US-Led Capitalist World Order 
 
After 1945, Japan disappeared from the ranks of the great powers and 
also from most of mainstream IR other than IPE, where its economic 
resurgence played significantly. In realist perspective, it was just a 
subordinate ally of the US, with this view supporting the maintenance of 
a Eurocentric view of world politics. The only exception to this sidelining 
was a brief period during the early and middle 1990s, when Japan’s 
strong economic growth generated a fashion, especially in the US, for 
seeing it as the likely challenger for superpower status (Huntington 
1991: 8; 1993; Layne: 1993: 42-3, 51; Spruyt 1998). With Japan’s 
economic stagnation, this fashion faded quickly.  
 
Although it is true that Japan has been both subordinate to the US, and 
militarily inert, it is untrue that it has been unimportant to the 
configuration and dynamics of wealth and power. The magnitude of 
Japan’s power has increased markedly, with its GDP surpassing that of 
the Soviet Union during the 1980s. Its former role as a self-seeking 
imperial great power has morphed into serving as the key pillar 
supporting US superpowerdom in Asia (Inoguchi, 1986). There has been 
a great deal of continuity in its role as a model and hub for much of the 
development process in East Asia. Japan has been crucial both to the 
victory of the West in the Cold War, and to the more general triumph of 
capitalism over command economy that both won the Cold War and 
shaped the post-Cold War world. 
 
In politico-military terms, by far the main significance of Japan in the 
configuration of world power since 1945 has been the essential role it 
plays in supporting the US as the only superpower, both during the Cold 
War and after. This supportive role is only partly about Japan’s provision 
of bases, and its role in containment. The US is certainly still the leading 
world power in material terms, but equally important is its social position, 
which is often marginalized in the materialist perspective of realism. The 
real key to US superpower status is that the next two biggest centres of 
capital and technology in the international system, Europe and Japan, 
subordinated themselves within US-dominated alliances (Nye, 2002). 
The US thus both cemented a democratic/capitalist ideological 
consensus on the basic principles of the world economy, and prevented 
serious great power coalition forming against it (Layne, 1993: 5-7). The 
US is a superpower not just because of its material capability, but also 
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because of its institutionalized and consensual partnerships with the EU 
and Japan. The endurance of such partnerships, despite the drift 
towards unilateralism in US policy that surfaced during the Bush 
administration (2001-8), and has resurfaced in Trump’s ‘America first’ 
policy, is a testimony to its strength. 
 
Within that framing, Japan’s economic success, and its influential 
resumption of its earlier role as the development model and hub for East 
Asia, have been important. Japan not only pushed along the Asian 
Tigers, but also discredited the command economy approach to 
modernity, serving once again as a model for the Chinese turn to 
capitalism.  
 
The story of Japan’s economic miracle needs no repeating here. Its 
rapid economic resurgence provided the basis for Japan to resume its 
role as the economic and developmental core for East Asia. It still led by 
the example of its developmental state, but now added to this aid, 
investment, the transfer of technology, and the setting up of regional 
production chains. After independence, and under US hegemony, South 
Korea and Taiwan carried on with an authoritarian developmental state 
that clearly resembled the Japanese colonial system, and laid the 
foundations for their post-independence rise to wealth and power. Like 
the other Asian Tigers, South Korea has been very successful at 
generating wealth and power. Yet the legitimacy of the leaders in the 
former colonies hinged on the extent to which they fought against the 
Japanese—which made it an imperative for those who were trained in 
the Japanese imperial army to insist on discontinuity rather than 
continuity. Likewise, for politicians and academics alike, speaking of the 
Japanese developmental legacy remains a risky topic in an age when 
the legitimacy of the state must be wedded to nationalist stories of 
development that celebrate the autonomy of the state.  
 
Close links between the South Korean and Taiwanese economies on the 
one hand, and the Japanese on the other, re-emerged from the 
wreckage of war. Cumings (1984), argues that as Japan moved away 
from earlier product cycles such as textiles and heavy industry it 
transferred these to Taiwan and South Korea, and others in East Asia in 
the ‘flying geese’ model of finance and technology transfer. From the 
1970s, South Korea’s and Taiwan’s economic miracles added to the 
effect of Japan’s economic miracle in raising the status of Northeast Asia 
as the third core of the global capitalist economy. Like Japan, the ‘Asian 
Tigers’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) followed 
export-led industrialization, which proved to be as successful for them as 
it had been for Japan. Enabled both by state-led policies and by 
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extensive aid and investment from foreign backers, the Asian Tigers 
tripled their GDP per capita in a little over two decades – by 1988, they 
accounted for 8.1% of world trade, almost double the share held by the 
whole of Latin America (Frieden, 2006: 317; Loth, 2014: 134). In South 
Korea, exports increased at an average rate of 8% per year between 
1962-1989; per capita income rose by a factor of 52 during the same 
period (Zeiler, 2014: 312). A similar, though later, and lesser, story could 
be told about Japan and the development of Southeast Asian countries.  
 
Once Mao was dead, the success of the Asian Tiger’s development 
influenced Chinese leaders to open up through a combination of export-
led industrialization and labour-intensive development (Sugihara, 2013; 
Wong, 1997). China also followed the Asian Tigers in using Japan’s 
early authoritarian developmental state model to maintain a system of 
low wages, while keeping both labour organizations and dissent in 
check. While the postcolonial core-periphery relationship between 
Japan, and South Korea and Taiwan, was re-established quickly, there 
was a much longer break between Japan’s early assistance to, and 
inspiration of, Chinese reformers. Between 1937 and 1945, Japan had 
mainly ruined China, and this was exacerbated by the brutal civil war 
amongst the Chinese themselves (Paine, 2012: locs. 2370, 4893). 
During Mao’s rule, China tried a different path to development, though 
even then, from the 1950s to the 1970s, some in the CCP looked upon 
Japan as a development model (King, 2014).  
 
Once reform and opening up began in China, Japan again began to play 
a major role in China’s development. Deng Xiaoping ‘pumped the trickle 
of Japanese visitors to Beijing for information on how their country’s 
leaders had managed to modernize science, technology, and industry’ 
(Schell and Delury, 2013: 272), and saw Japan as ‘a model for China’s 
own economic modernization’ (Yahuda, 2014: loc. 2179). Japan made 
significant contributions via both aid and investment to China’s 
modernization, providing the capital and the industrial technology that 
China needed for its economic takeoff, and helping Deng to overcome 
resistance to his market reform and opening up (Yahuda, 2014: locs. 
627, 2258; Smith, 2015: 35-6; Kokubun et al., 2017: 95-121). Indeed, as 
Hagström (2015: 131) argues, by giving so much assistance to China’s 
rapid development from the 1980s onwards, Japan has been complicit in 
creating the material foundations for the security threat that it 
increasingly perceives from China. With the escalation since 2010 of the 
confrontation over the Sankaku/Diaoyu islands, the insulation between 
economic and political/security relations, has begun to break down.  
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Japan therefore played a very substantial ideological and economic, and 
to a lesser extent military, role in the ending of the Cold War. Its 
alignment with the US, and serving as another exemplary model of the 
capitalist developmental state, was and is one of the key pillars 
supporting America’s superpower status. Japan’s successful 
development not only put the Soviet Union and its model into the shade, 
but also facilitated the spread of capitalism throughout Asia.  
 
Japan and the Transition to a Post-Western World Order? 
 
The next phase of the global structure of wealth and power seems likely 
to pose significant challenges for Japan. The rise of China puts Japan 
next door to the second, and potentially first, biggest power in the 
system, a problem compounded by the intensely anti-Japanese 
nationalism cultivated by the Chinese government in its patriotic 
education campaign. Japan’s population is shrinking in a world in which 
big populations are again becoming a key determinant of power. And 
Japan is at risk of becoming the front line in a US-China rivalry at a time 
when the US is becoming less reliable as an ally.  
 
So far, Japan’s government has sought to adjust by deepening its 
alliance with the US, and trying to shake off the shackles of its pacifist 
constitution and become once again a ‘normal state’ in its relation to 
military power. It has also begun cultivating security relations with other 
Asian states that are likewise wary of rising Chinese power. While it has 
the theoretical options to bandwagon with China or pursue an 
independent great power status, neither looks attractive, and both 
require that Japan come to terms with its ‘history problem’—that is, over 
how to write a history of its imperial past that takes into consideration the 
memories held in the former victim states. China is bent on taking 
revenge for Japan’s role in China’s ‘century of humiliation’, making 
partnership difficult. The North Korean missile tests render the option of 
going it alone look dangerous.  
 
The coming decades will be shaped by what happens within and 
between China and the US. Japan cannot hope for much amelioration of 
China’s hostility to it, even though Sino-Japanese relations are vital to 
China’s desire to have primacy in Asia. Japan now has to consider the 
security consequences of its economic relationship with China. Like its 
neighbours in India, Southeast Asia and Australia, it will probably try 
both to engage with China and hedge against it, playing to increase 
cooperation amongst themselves and trying to keep the US on their 
side. But if China plays its hand cleverly by threatening Japan less, 
and/or the US plays its hand badly by undermining the trust of its allies, 
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then Japan might have to consider the options of bandwagoning with 
China or taking an independent stand. In either case, that action would 
pull the social props from the standing of the US as a global superpower. 
Despite its relative decline, Japan remains significantly consequential to 
the global structure of wealth and power.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The stories we have told above raise the question of why Japan’s 
position and role in the world history of the last 150 years has been so 
distorted and unbalanced in the study of IR. Why does Japan fade in 
and out of the IR stories? Once the filters of Eurocentrism and realism 
are stripped away, several explanations seem to bear: 
1. Both racism, initially explicit, but latterly implicit, and Eurocentrism, 
seem to account for the difficulty in acknowledging that Japan was part 
of the first round of modernity. As Edward Said put it, Orientalism = 
Eurocentrism (1993). In Orientalist discourse the Orient is presumed to 
be ‘stagnant’. This necessarily makes Japan, which geographically is in 
the Orient, an anomaly in the Orientalist/Eurocentric imagining of 
historical development.  
2. Being overshadowed by its catastrophic behavior during the 1930s 
and 40s, and IR’s forgetting of the link between internationalism and 
imperialism, seem to account for IR’s neglect of Japan’s role as a normal 
great power during the interwar period. This, plus the subordination of 
IPE to realism, explains the neglect of Japan’s importance as the 
development model and hub for Northeast Asia, and the importance of 
this to the outcome of the Cold War. The post-1945 consensus that 
development is a universal good to be aspired to, ironically splits the 
assessment of Japanese colonialism, and its developmental 
contribution, between complete denial or affirmation. To paraphrase 
Escobar (2012), Japan’s history since the late 19th century as the Asian 
outpost of modernity, and the developmental hub for East Asia, has 
unsettled and politicized the meaning of development and its role in the 
making and unmaking of East Asia. 
3. Four explanations working in synergy seem to account for Japan’s 
marginalization in the story of the Cold War and after. One is the 
strength of neorealism, especially polarity theory, in IR thinking, which, 
because of its emphasis on military power and autonomous foreign 
policy, discounts Japan. A second is US-centrism in IR, which is inclined 
to see Japan and Europe as being more dependent on US superpower 
than constitutive of it. A third is the general discounting of economic 
power in most mainstream IR thinking, and the particular failure to 
connect Japan’s position in the first rise of modernity, and its role as an 
early development model and hub for Northeast Asia, to its crucial role in 
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the rise of a capitalist East Asia that is now becoming the central fact of 
world politics. A fourth is Japan’s divided view of itself and its history 
(Dudden, 2008), which means that Japan has hardly registered in the 
rest of the world in telling its own story. 
 
Emphasising some parts of Japan’s story while suppressing, forgetting, 
or marginalizing others, produces an unbalanced and distorted picture of 
how this important country has both fitted into, and shaped, the global 
structure of wealth, power and ideology since the Meiji restoration. In 
academic terms, this is both wrong in itself, and complicit in maintaining 
excessively Eurocentric and realist understandings of world politics. In 
practical terms, it provides a poor foundation for academics and policy-
makers to understand the history and dynamics of both Asia, and the 
international system/society as a whole over the past century and a half. 
As we move out of the era of Western dominance, it is more than past 
time that Japan’s full story as the first non-Western modern great power 
be given the prominence and balance it deserves. On the 150th 
anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, rethinking Japan, points to a deeper 
need to rethink the Western biases of IR theory and the potential (or not) 
for non-Western approaches to give a clearer picture.  
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